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What is the meaning of dialectic in the Platonic 
dialogues? Plato struggled with this question and his 
words manifest this struggle, though no definitive an-
swer is ever forthcoming. In this essay, I have a two-
fold proposal: first, to present five questions which 
focus on what I take to be the key factors in Plato's 
use of dialectic; secondly, to draw out a response to 
this set of questions from the following works: 
Theaetetus, Parmenides, Sophist, Statesman and the 
Seventh Letter. Some of these dialogues do not fully 
answer each of the questions. In such cases, treatment 
of the question is concise. Some of the dialogues also 
intimate an answer which is given more exhaustive con-
sideration in a dialogue which precedes the five 
mentioned. In this event, I briefly describe the con-
nection between the previous dialogue and the one at 
hand. The essay concludes with my own reflections on 
Platonic dialectic. In particular, I take up the issue 
of whether dialectic is a method of discovery or a 
method of clarification and attempt to resolve this ap-
parent tension by arguing that pedagogy and scienctific 
inquiry are not dichotomized pursuits for Plato. 
1. Each dialogue utilizes or exhibits several dif-
ferent dialectical methods, dialectic itself being the 
broad notion of a question-answer procedure which, if 
engaged in by the proper participants, can be used to 
bring forth for examination the structure of reality. 
The method was originally devised by Socrates to induce 
humility and aporia in the interlocutor. This negative 
dialectic is referred to as the Socratic elenchus. 
After this preliminary "catharsis," Socrates then used 
the epagoge, or an inductive method in a loose sense, 
to consider the similarity between particular proposi-
tions and thereby move to a more general or universal 
proposition which subsumes the individual cases beneath 
Plato takes the dialectical method over from 
Socrates and grounds Socrates' search for universals or 
definitions in a metaphysical scheme—the hierarchy of 
The Questions 
it. 
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forms. Hence, the dialectical movement gains a perma-
nent terminus, a methaphysical underpinning, in the 
transition to Plato via the Parmenidean influence. 
Plato does not wholly abandon the features of the 
Socratic dialectic but incorporates them into his more 
sophisticated version. Platonic dialectic is primarily 
the method of collection and division; other subsidiary 
methods, however, are used to assist the method of 
analysis and synthesis, namely, the method of analogy 
and the method of hypothesis. One of the questions I 
try to answer in this essay is how the dialectical 
method develops in these middle and later Platonic 
dialogues. Following this inquiry into the developmen-
tal sequence, I describe the salient points of the 
demonstrations offered by Plato. 
2. Philosophic inquiry has a goal or aim for Plato 
and the dialectical method is preliminary or propaedeu-
tic for this goal. Dialectic is the path the soul must 
traverse in order to glimpse the true realities and, 
ultimately, to be brought within the aura of the 
highest reality, the Good. The eternal eide them-
selves, however, can only be apprehended by an immedi-
ate intuitive grasp. Dialectic only brings these 
truths "into view from a distance." 1 Moreover, the di-
alectical process is pulled along or directed by the 
soul's vague intimation of that which transcends the 
essences, the Good Itself. The dialogue the Symposium 
displays this vague intimation as an intellectual long-
ing for the full-faced view of that Beauty from which 
all particular beautiful things are derived. My second 
question is: how does each dialogue contribute to an 
understanding of dialectic as a "turning away" or rev-
ersal of one's orientation from the sensible world and 
a recapturing of our soul's pre-existent direction to-
wards the forms and, more significantly, beyond being? 
3. The dialectical path, however, is not to be 
traveled alone but, at least initially, with a guide or 
teacher. Dialectic is a conversational mode both for 
Plato and Socrates, an intellectual activity engaged in 
by two participants—the teacher poses a question to 
which the student or interlocutor responds. In the 
Socratic dialogues, the question-answer form has two 
specific pedagogical goals. Negatively, it is to strip 
intellectual conceit from the student by showing him 
that what he thought was knowledge, is, at best, doxa, 
that is, opinion or belief, and thereby evoke a state 
of aporia or puzzlement. This aporia often has a posi-
tive repercussion. The student is enlisted in the 
cooperative search for the truth, or, more precisely, 
in the use of the question-answer model to discover, by 
the method of induction, the definitions of his words. 
This Socratic method of induction or epogoge* procedes 
by discovering what is common among enumerated 
instances. 
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The two participants are an integral part of the 
dialectical process, both structurally and disposition-
ally. With regard to structure, the teacher usually 
takes the role of questioner, inviting the student to 
make statements which are then subjected to searching 
challenges or, at least, requesting the student to af-
firm or deny certain propositions presented to him. In 
the earlier Socratic dialogues, the interlocutor was 
impelled to formulate his beliefs as hypotheses and the 
teacher, in turn, would draw out the implications of 
such hypotheses in order to examine their consistency 
or inconsistency with other beliefs held as true. In 
the present dialogues, I trace a reduction in the ac-
tual contribution made by the interlocutor, though 
structurally he remains indispensable for affirming or 
denying the proposition put forth. Thus, I inquire 
into the change in the formal role of the questions and 
answers in each dialogue. 
This, however, hardly exhausts my concern with the 
participants. On the contrary, a certain type of per-
son is required for the progress of dialectic. The 
teacher or guide makes this selection based upon the 
intellectual and moral potential of the individual. 
Plato describes these preconditions in a quasi-
metaphorical tone: the teacher must discern whether a 
particular person glimpsed the forms in his pre-natal 
existence long enough to enable him, through dialectic, 
to recollect this last vision. By this metaphor, Plato 
seems to indicate that a degree of native intelligence 
and an attraction to the virtuous life as exemplified 
by the teacher, are signs of the student worthy of di-
alectical training. Thus, the second part of this 
third inquiry involves how the dialogues clarify the 
aptitude for engagement in dialectic. 
4. The fourth question I present is concerned with 
the effect dialectic has on the participants. Does it 
improve their mental acuity or moral temperament and, 
if so, how does dialectic accomplish this? Plato 
describes three types of paths that can be taken to 
come within sight of the eidos: dialectic is the path 
by knowledge, by rational discourse or a discursive 
reenactment of the logos. And, as I intend to show in 
each dialogue, by engaging in this reflective process 
the participants come to a clearer understanding of the 
logos itself and its limitations. Hence, another ef-
fect to be detected in each dialogue is the logos, the 
linguistic articulation and clarification of the struc-
ture of reality. But dialectic is not the only route 
to the true reality. There are also the paths by love 
and by death or purification. Neither of these alter-
nate paths play a dominant role in the dialogues under 
consideration. Nonetheless, they complement and rein-
force the dialectical process. 
Eros is the bond that unites the teacher and stu-
dent in friendship and trust. So, by this union of 
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kindred spirits, the dialectical process is guarded 
from any tendency to veer off into eristics or polem-
ics, the spurious forms of dialogical exchange. The 
eidos is the source of the erotic pull towards the 
Beautiful. Sensuous beauty on the level of images can 
be the occasion for the soul's reflection on the form 
of Beauty so that the soul, in seeking the origin of 
beautiful things, is drawn to pure form. Furthermore, 
the path by death or purification is always present— 
the paradigmatic teacher, Socrates, exemplifying the 
liberation of the soul from sensible desires and 
sufferings. A condition for living the life of philo-
sophical inquiry is this death to bodily preoccupations 
in order to freely engage in dialectic with like 
companions. Thus, as corollary to my question on the 
effect of dialectic, is the question of whether these 
other dimensions of the journey toward the Good by way 
of mania or liberation from the bodily are present. 
5. My fifth and final question regards the role of 
metaphor and imagery in the dialogues as a counter-
balance for dialectic, for the strictly rational quest 
to understand and formulate the ontological structure. 
I argue for a dialectical tension within dialectic it-
self, between dialectic as rational reflection and 
another mode of understanding, the imaginative intui-
tion. Thus, I cite examples in the dialogues illus-
trating a metaphorical counterpoise. At the outset, 
let me offer this hypothesis for the interplay of 
metaphor and rational discourse: the soul is the 
metaxy, the mediator between the worlds of the sensible 
and of the ideal. The soul can move closer to the 
eidos by participation in dialogos (dialogue), the 
vocal expression of the true combination of the forms, 
and thereby come closer to understanding the forms 
themselves. Logos can never actually reach the eide, 
fully and clearly apprehend them, because logos is 
fastened to the world of becoming, to images. Yes, it 
moves from those images to a more pristine abstract un-
derstanding, but language, like the soul, is a mediator 
between the worlds of becoming and being. The images 
and meataphors that Plato elicits are not to be looked 
upon as impediments to the ascent to the forms. On the 
contrary, they offer clues to the eidos that often cor-
rect faulty or ambiguous words or concepts. 
In the spirit of dialectic, then, let me turn to 
the dialogues and press five questions: 
1. How is the method demonstrated? 
2. What does the dialogue say about the goal or 
aim of dialectic? 
3. What is the relationship between the question-
er and the respondent? 
4. Does participation in the conversation have an 
edifying or enriching effect upon the dialogi-
cal partners? 
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5. When and why does Plato appeal to metaphor to 
further the conversation's progress? 
The format of my answers is to examine what occurs 
on three different levels in the dialogues and, by do-
ing so, elicit suitable responses. The levels are, 
first, the actual content of the dialogue; second, what 
occurs between the two participants; third, the effect 
that following the dialogue has on the reader. 
Theaetetus 
The Theaetetus is a transitional dialogue insofar 
as the method demonstrated is the Socratic elenchus, 
but the total effect of the dialogue is an appeal for 
an ontological grounding of the knowing process. 
Theaetetus and Socrates actually discuss the nature of 
knowledge and, in the course of their conversation, hit 
upon no satisfactory definition. The structure of 
their exchange illustrates the Socratic dialectic 
wherein the interlocutor posits an hypothesis, in this 
case on the nature of knowledge, and the teacher draws 
out the consequences of holding this position. This 
method is used negatively to refute the claim that we 
derive knowledge from sense perception. Hence, the di-
alogue in its entirety is an example of the Socratic 
elenchus. The interlocutor, Theaetetus, proposes four 
different definitions of knowledge, each of which is 
challenged by Socrates, shown to involve inconsisten-
cies or untenable conclusions and is set aside in favor 
of a more sophisticated hypothetical definition which 
takes into account the limitations of the preceding 
one. At the end of the conversation, no satisfactory 
definition has been brought forth, yet a deepened un-
derstanding of the subject matter occurs. 
The discovery of the indispensability of the forms 
takes place both on the first and third levels. The 
discovery is made by examining two other hypotheses in 
addition to Theaetetus', the Protagorean and Heraclei-
tian, and finding that neither on its own merits 
provides an adequate definition of knowledge. The 
Protagorean and Heracleitian positions fail because, 
like the proposition that knowledge is sense percep-
tion, they attempt to ground the dialectical process, 
that is, the process of coming to know, in the world of 
becoming, the world of a plurality of individual con-
crete things. Protagoras' doctrine of man as the meas-
ure of all things proves unsatisfactory as a definition 
of knowledge because he asserts only a subjective 
criterion of truth and such a view precludes any arbi-
tration between conflicting opinions. The Heracleitian 
position likewise has a critical weakness: without a 
stationary object to which concepts and worlds refer, 
all discourse is rendered impossible.. If the totality 
is in constant flux, nothing can be predicated of 
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another because nothing has a definite characteristic. 
Moreover, the Heracleitian theory is itself a perfora-
tory contradiction because the very articulation of the 
theory implies that the words used have meanings and, 
therefore, refer to something stable. The upshot of 
the examination of the doctrine of becoming is the 
recognition, had vaguely by the participants, but more 
clearly by the reader, that the dialectician is in 
search of a permanent reality. Socrates' next move is 
to consider the antithetical position to a world wholly 
of becoming—the Parmenidean. The implication of 
demonstrating the untenable conclusion of the Heraclei-
tian position is that its alternative might have 
something right about it. Socrates, however, does not 
return to the Parmenidean position. 
Let me shift now to the second level of the dialo-
gue to note what has transpired in the structure of the 
conversation. (My understanding of these features of 
dialectic will constitute a shift to the third level.) 
The flaw in the Protagorean doctrine is that without 
some reference to a norm or standard, differences of 
opinion cannot be settled. Ironically, the dialectical 
exchange between Theaetetus and Socrates is an implicit 
alternative to the Protagorean position. At nearly ev-
ery step of the conversation, Theaetetus' affirmative 
response indicates that the dialectician and his ap-
prentice are engaged in coming to an agreement about 
the meaning of knowledge. The question-answer struc-
ture, then, implies that consensus between the partici-
pants is a fundamental characteristic of both coming to 
know something and tacitly understanding the learning 
process itself. In this dialogue, Plato does not state 
the basis for this consensus, but the reader antici-
pates the theory of forms or essences. 
Plato indicates another feature of dialectic when 
he proposes the Parmenidean position but never explic-
itly mentions it again in the dialogue. Genuine di-
alectic progresses at a leisurely pace, has a certain 
free play in its movement which allows it to drop one 
argument for a more promising one. The noticeable ab-
sence of the Parmenidean doctrine sets up a tension for 
the reader--we know that his position contains a clue 
to Plato's resolution of the problem of what knowledge 
is. Plato adopts the notions of permanence and unity 
from Parmenides* monism and thus we can surmise that 
thought and its sensuous expression in language somehow 
unify the plurality in the perceptual field by ref-
erence to a permanent standard. 
Another critical feature of dialectic displayed on 
all three levels of the dialogue is the reflective turn 
away from sense perceptions to the mind itself in order 
to locate the objects of knowledge. In the struggle to 
work out a better definition, Theaetetus and Socrates 
probe cognitive activity itself for an explanation of 
how knowledge takes place. Plato has recourse to 
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metaphor at this point in the dialectic as a tool to 
lift the explanation of what knowing is from the level 
of the concrete to the abstract. This move brings to 
mind the explanation of the ascent to knowledge in 
terms of the Divided Line. In the Republic, Plato 
described the movement away from the world of becoming 
to that of being as a four-fold step starting with re-
flections of sensible objects, then ascending to these 
objects of perceptions, or what Plato refers to as 
images, to mathematical entities and finally to the 
eide or essential realities themselves. Each level 
corresponds with a degree of knowledge attained: 
answering to these four sections, assume these 
four affections occurring in the soul—intellec-
tion or reason for the highest, understanding for 
the second, belief for the third, and for the 
last, picture thinking or conjecture—and arrange 
them in a proportion, considering that they par-
ticipate in clearness and precision in the same 
degree as their objects partake of truth and 
reality.* 
In the Theaetetus, Plato uses the metaphor of an 
aviary stocked with birds to account for the knower 
looking inward for the objects to which his thoughts 
and words refer. Though the aviary image has shortcom-
ings because it cannot account for the possibility of 
false judgments, nonetheless, it is a sensuous analogue 
for the dialectician's search for essences, for the 
permanent abstract realities upon which to affix the 
meaning of words. This image enables Theaetetus to 
ascend from the level of true opinion to that of 
understanding. Therefore, at this new level, knowledge 
means giving a rational account of a true opinion. By 
giving a rational account, Socrates means that 
Theaetetus-should be able to justify his belief in 
logos—rational discourse. Thus, in the concluding 
section of the dialogue, Theaetetus and Socrates at-
tempt a primitive analysis of the structure of language 
in order to ascertain the conditions for knowing 
something. Propositions are a complex network of words 
which can be reduced to their components. But words, 
as names, refer to primary elements for which no ac-
count can be given. Dialectic, on the first level, 
then, is roughly formulated as the interaction between 
simple essences which are intuitively known and a com-
bination of these elements which are known by rational 
reflection. 
The goal of dialectic is stated on the level of the 
conversation by Socrates: "That is why we should make 
all speed to take flight from this world to the other, 
and that means becoming like the divine so far as we 
can, and that again is to become righteous with the 
help of wisdom." 1 On the second level, the level of 
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the demonstration of dialectic in the dialogue, 
"becoming like the divine" is exemplified in the rela-
tionship between Socrates and Theaetetus. Theaetetus 
entrusts himself to his teacher by his honest respon-
ses. Theaetetus takes the risk of having his ideas ex-
amined and refuted by his teacher. Why is Theaetetus 
willing to take this risk? 
Here I shift to the third level of dialectic, my 
own understanding of the dialogue. Theaetetus intuits 
the Good in Socrates, the intellectual midwife who has 
no dogmatic positions to force upon his students, but 
instead encourages them to give birth to their own 
opinions, to put them to the dialectical test for their 
rational content. Yes, it is true that Socrates 
refutes all of Theaetetus' hypotheses on the nature of 
knowledge. However, Theaetetus has come much closer to 
the Truth by entering into dialogue with Socrates. 
Perhaps there is no form called "knowledge." Rather, 
we come to an understanding of knowledge by both par-
ticipating in and reflecting on the dialectical pro-
cess. 
At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates invites 
Theaetetus to join him in dialogue so that Theaetetus 
may display his reputed qualities of virtue and intel-
ligence. At the end, Theaetetus has a better under-
standing of the meaning of these qualities because 
Socrates has brought them to fuller fruition. Socrates 
expresses the effect of the dialectical process on 
Theaetetus: "Then supposing you should ever henceforth 
try to conceive afresh, Theaetetus, if you succeed, 
your embryo thoughts will be the better as a conse-
quence of today's scrutiny, and if you remain barren, 
you will be gentler and more agreeable to your compa-
nions, having the good sense not to fancy you know what 
you do not know."* But has Theaetetus really been left 
without any positive understanding? Are these the 
words of the ironic man who has given Theaetetus 
something far richer than a pat definition of knowl-
edge? Socrates has devoted time and attention, the 
gifts of friendship, to Theaetetus in whom Socrates 
also intuits the Good. Theaetetus, in turn, is bound 
to Socrates out of love and respect because Socrates 
has taken him along the path toward the Good by 
knowledge and love. 
Parmenides 
In the Parmenides, the hypothesis dropped in the 
Theaetetus is reposited in order to subject it to a di-
alectical examination. Thus, the explicit theme of the 
dialogue is the doctrine of Being, the view that all of 
reality is a permanent unity. Socrates and Zeno initi-
ate the dialectical exchange by inquiry into the pro-
blem of how the forms combine between themselves. They 
mention the participation of individual things in the 
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forms but quickly pass over this relation because con-
trary forms can be predicated of the same individual. 
Predication of many forms to one individual does not 
present problems for the dialectical mode of thought 
and language. However, the participation of a unitary 
form in another does entail difficulty. Hence, the 
genuine problem for Plato in the dialogue is the nature 
of the participation among the forms themselves. The 
Parmenidean doctrine is a clue to why dialectic has 
trouble reckoning with the relation between the forms. 
The puzzle is how the One, a unity, can be predicated 
of Many, a plurality. The problem is set up in the 
second half of the dialogue with Parmenides' defense of 
his own position by attempting to predicate existence 
and non-existence of the One. 
In the context of the dialogue, the first level, 
Parmenides offers a rule for the dialectical exercise: 
the skilled dialectician must draw out the consequences 
of both affirming and denying a proposition. The 
second half of the dialogue is a frustrated attempt to 
employ this rule on the doctrine of Being. The predi-
cation of existence and non-existence to six elementary 
notions—unity, plurality, rest, motion, similarity and 
difference--engenders a host of inconsistencies on the 
first and second levels of the dialectic. The reader, 
however, must take this negative conclusion to a higher 
level and ask what this outcome reveals about dialec-
tic. Has Parmenides given us an example of mere 
sophistry or has Plato taught us something about the 
reaches of dialectic? 
I argue for the latter of these possibilities. 
Early on in the dialogue, Parmenides describes dialec-
tic as a "preliminary training" for knowledge of the 
forms themselves. 3 It is worth mentioning that in the 
Republic, Plato specifies types of training which 
facilitate the mind's turn away from sensible reality 
toward the eternal truths. Geometry, astronomy, rhe-
toric and music have only instrumental value; they are 
propaedeutic for engagement in dialectic because they 
train the soul to orient its view to the eidos.' Now 
Parmenides' confusion indicates that dialectic itself 
is preliminary because the most abstract terms seem to 
lie outside its reaches. There are two explanations of 
why these terms cannot be rationally apprehended in 
themselves: these forms may be so abstract that they 
lie beyond logos or they may be so general that they 
pervade all forms and things. The terms unity, plural-
ity, rest, motion, similarity and difference are 
perhaps, then, the ubiquitous conditions for knowing. 
On the other hand, being and non-being seem to be boun-
dary terms which situate logos—the articulation of the 
structure of reality—in the intermediary region of 
becoming. Another limitation of Plato's formulation of 
dialectic is also revealed in the unsuccessful attempt 
to predicate existence and non-existence. Plato tries 
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to reduce the relation of identity (and non-identity) 
to one of predication. 
The second half of the Parmenides thus unveils 
those elementary universals which constitute the upper 
limit of the hierarchical order of eide. Dialectic 
moves upward towards these richest and fullest reali-
ties but they cannot be combined and, consequently, 
cannot be rationally apprehended. On the other hand, a 
downward movement from the rightly intuited genus to-
ward the indivisible species was intimated in the 
Theaetetus by Socrates' discussion of definition as 
knowledge of the individuating characteristic. 7 In the 
Parmenides, Zeno describes a key feature of the 
Platonic dialectic; the first step in this method is 
looking over many particulars in order to discover what 
is common to all. The search for the right genus is 
one of the tasks of the skilled dialectician "because 
most people are unaware that you cannot hit upon truth 
and gain understanding without ranging in this way over 
the whole field."' Finally, on the first level of the 
dialogue, Parmenides maintains that the eidos can only 
be "seen" or intuitively apprehended by those who have 
souls akin to the divine: "Only a man of exceptional 
gifts will be able to see that a form, or essence just 
by itself, does exist in each case, and it will require 
someone still more remarkable to discover it and to in-
struct another who has thoroughly examined all these 
difficulties."' Hence, the effect of dialectical 
training is to prepare for this intuitive grasp of the 
form in itself. 
Sophi st 
The Sophist most clearly illustrates the Platonic, 
as opposed to the Socratic, dialectic—the method of 
collection and division. The ostensible theme of the 
dialogue is the search for the correct definition of 
the sophist. However, on the second level, the actual 
development of dialectic, Plato shows that the method 
of synthesis and analysis uncovers the true combination 
of the forms. In the context of the dialogue, the 
Athenian Stranger sets forth the task for dialectic: 
now that we have agreed that the kinds stand to-
ward one another in the same way as regards 
blending, is not some science needed as a guide 
on the voyage of discourse, if one is to succeed 
in pointing out which kinds are consonant, and 
which are incompatible with one another—also— 
whether there are certain kinds that pervade them 
all and connect them so that they can blend, and 
again, where there are divisions, whether there 
are certain others that traverse wholes and are 
responsible for the division? 1 0 
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The relationship of language to the order of the 
forms is also explicitly stated in the dialogue. The 
Stranger uses the metaphor of weaving to explain the 
relation of the forms to each other. The aptness of 
the metaphor is best viewed in the structure of 
language. Here, two different forms of speech, nouns 
and verbs, analogous to the warp and the woof of the 
woven fabirc, interweave to form statements. 1 1 A true 
statement, then, is one which correctly maps the genu-
ine "interweave" of the forms. The reader, however, 
reflecting upon the text, can come to understand the 
Platonic ontology as a vast network of interconnected 
essences. Rational discourse is the articulation of 
this complexity. 
Now let us return to the second level, the dialogi-
cal structure, to highlight Theaetetus' and the Stran-
ger's exhibition of dialectic. The Stranger antici-
pates the difficulty of tracing the definition of the 
sophist. Before embarking on this forbidding journey, 
the guide suggests that Theaetetus and he examine a 
corollary dialectical move—the method of analogy. The 
dialectician selects a genus which he anticipates will 
be similar in structure to the word 'sophist' but less 
complicated. So, they make a trial run on the defini-
tion of the angler. Upon arrival at a satisfactory 
division of the genus down to the indivisible species, 
in this case the definition of an angler, the dialecti-
cian and his apprentice reflect back on the process in 
order to extrapolate the type of questions asked that 
brought about a successful division. Next, they apply 
this set of questions to 'sophist'. As the dialogue 
progresses, six different divisions are made and each 
terminates in one of the many guises of the sophist. 
However, none of these divisions is looked upon as a 
failure becuse the six divisions as a group are, in ef-
fect, a collection. The divisions illustrate the 
dialectician's struggle to intuitively apprehend the 
right genus. The correct selection culminates, if the 
proper divisions are made, in the true definition of 
'sophist'. The Stranger offers a description of the 
method of division: "Holding fast to the characters of 
which the Sophist partakes until we have stripped off 
all that he has in common with others and left only the 
nature that is peculiar to him." 1 1 The apparent goal 
of the dialogue, the definition of 'sophist', is set in 
contrast to what occurs, the dialectician's demonstra-
tion of his art. 
The participants in this dialogue deserve mention 
because they indicate a structural development in the 
dialectical process. Plato reduces the role of the in-
terlocutor to that of merely affirming or denying 
propositions. This reduction indicates a structural 
transition from dialectic as an actual conversation 
between two people to dialectic as the thought process 
itself. "[TJhinking and discourse are the same thing. 
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except that what we call thinking is, precisely, the 
inward dialogue carried on by the mind itself, without 
spoken sound." 1' Taking this comment to the third 
level of the dialogue, I interpret the significance of 
this shift as the intended effect of training in 
dialectic. The question-answer structure should even-
tually be internalized by the student and thereby 
result in the student's own ability to think correctly. 
It is fitting that Plato early in the dialogue suggests 
that dialectic is the purifying of the mind from 
ignorance. 1* The movement to purify the mind of its 
ignorance is analogous to the method of division in di-
alectic wherein the genus is submitted to "purifica-
tion" by division in order to arrive at the indivisible 
species. Thus, in this dialogue a coalescence of the 
paths by moral purification and by knowledge occurs. 
Finally, I would gravely neglect the Sophist 
without a consideration of the subject matter of the 
dialogue, the tethering down to the true definition of 
the sophist. In the process of demonstrating the di-
alectical method, a picture of the sophist emerges as a 
foil to the genuine lover of wisdom. The dialogists 
gradually establish a dichotomy between the sophist and 
the philosopher which can be capsulized in the follow-
ing three contrasts. First, as propaedeutic for the 
dialectical practice, the philosopher cleanses himself 
of all presuppositions by a confession of ignorance un-
like the sophist who, ironically, is furthest from the 
truth when he arrogantly claims to possess it. "When a 
person supposes that he knows, and does not know; this 
appears to be the great source of all the errors of the 
intellect." 1 5 Secondly, as we see this point unfold 
before us, the philosopher pursues true definitions, 
whereas the sophist avoids them and, instead, revels in 
linguistic imbroglios. We hear the Stranger express 
this in an interrogative: "When we say that he 
deceives with that semblance we spoke of and that his 
art is a practice of deception, shall we be saying 
that, as the effect of his art, our minds think what is 
false, or what shall we mean?" 1' Thirdly, the genuine 
dialectician lures his student to abstract heights by 
the art of persuasion while the sophist uses coercive 
means such as subtle psychological manipulation in or-
der to trip his victims up in contradictions and, 
thereby, "win" his point. Moreover, the dramatic ten-
sion in this dialogue reaches a denouement with the 
third contrast. The conversation comes to rest on the 
definition of the sophist as one who feigns dialectic 
through the specious art of contradiction. Neverthe-
less, the dialecticians achieve a theoretical triumph 
over this conniver by faithfully continuing the dialec-
tical division until the method settles on the individ-
uating difference—the sophist as mimic of the very art 
used to capture his correct definition. 
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Statesman 
The explicit theme of the Statesman is, again, the 
search for an exact definition. However, the un-
derlying theme, the second level of the dialogue, is 
the search for a formula which orders the division of 
the genus. The dialectician, the Athenian Stranger, 
expresses the real goal of the dialogue within the 
text: 
[W]e must train ourselves to give and to under-
stand a rational account of every existent thing. 
For the existents which have no visible embodi-
ment, the existents which are of highest value 
and chief importance, are demonstrable only by 
reason and are not to be apprehended by any other 
means. All our present discussions have the aim 
of training us to apprehend this highest class of 
existents. 1 7 
Thus, shifting to the third level of the dialogue, I 
contend that Plato seeks a formula for the cleavage of 
the genus in order to insure the most nearly perfect 
matching of the structure of classification with the 
hierarchical arrangement of the eide. 
Let us proceed to the second level of the dialogue 
and follow the Stranger's struggle to tease out the ex-
act formula for classification. His first rendering is 
a rule of thumb which prescribes a subdivision that 
roughly splits the class down the middle. The 
Stranger, on the first level of the dialogue, demon-
strates this subdivision as the student and he progress 
toward the definition of 'Statesman'. He corrects the 
Younger Socrates' impulse to immediately aportion off a 
species from a genus rather than follow a symmetrical 
pattern downward to the correct classification. The 
Stranger also indicates that dialectic gains its objec-
tivity precisely because it follows the real order of 
forms. The dialectician reveals this characteristic by 
his repeated admonitions against the Younger Socrates 
who allows his subjective biases to influence his 
choice of division. For instance, the student suggests 
that the species "man" be aportioned off the class 
"animal." However, the teacher insists that the youth 
separated "man" off too soon in the general division. 
The teacher illustrates this mistake by proposing 
another animal capable of rational thought, the crane, 
who would also tend to separate off the species of 
which he is a member too early. Here Plato presses the 
point that dialectic itself is not the source of its 
own ordering. Instead, it is a tool whereby those of a 
philosophical disposition can articulate the structure 
of the real. Or, the point put more succinctly, the 
Platonic ontology has primacy while thought and lan-
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guage are the human attempts to approach the divine by 
understanding and expressing its structure. 
The Stranger discovers the formula for the right 
division further along in the dialogue in the notion of 
the art of measurement. This notion is subdivided into 
things measured relative to each other and things meas-
ured according to their relation of resemblance to a 
fixed norm. The due measure is the standard which 
makes art and an objective judgment of excess and 
defect possible. On the first level of the dialogue, 
the Stranger asserts that dialectic itself is based on 
a norm "due measure": "[Wjhen one day we come to give 
a full exposition of true accuracy in dialectic method, 
we shall find the need of this postulate concerning due 
measure . . . ."" Dialectic resembles the due meas-
ure when the philosopher can correctly analyze a class 
of things into the complete myriad of indivisible spe-
cies and, also, correctly synthesize many different 
things under their genus. 1' 
In the context of the dialogue, a corollary to 
analysis and syntheis emerges. The Stranger explains 
the method of example: 
It operates, does it not, when a factor identical 
with a factor in a less-known object is rightly 
believed to exist in some other better-known ob-
ject in quite another sphere of life? This com-
mon factor in each object, when it has been made 
the basis of a parallel examination of them both, 
makes it possible for us to achieve a single true 
judgment about each of them as forming one of a 
pair. 1 8 
On the second level of the dialogue, the Stranger and 
the Younger Socrates illustrate the method of example. 
They want to know whether the notion of the "tendance" 
of the human community is the proper genus for the 
definition of the Statesman. They are unclear about 
the meaning of 'tendance' but think that it vaguely 
resembles the notion of weaving. Thus, they apply the 
method of analysis to 'weaving' in order to clarify the 
meaning of 'tendance'. They feel confident that they 
have found the right genus because both the art of 
weaving and the art of tending mankind operate on the 
principle of due measure. The genuine Statesman weaves 
his citizenry together into a harmonious whole by find-
ing the proper hierarchy of their skills and profes-
sions and the proper balance of their temperaments. 
But the method of example can also be taken to the 
third level of the dialogue. The dialectician also 
follows the due measure of division in order to find 
true definitions. 
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Seventh Letter 
The final work I probe for answers concerning the 
development of the Platonic dialectic is the Seventh 
Letter. A pronounced structural change occurs: the 
question-answer format conducted by two participants, 
the teacher and student, is abandoned, at least osten-
sibly. However, I argue that Plato reveals the inten-
tion of dialectical training in this dialogue. Dialec-
tic as rational discourse is eventually internalized 
and becomes the form of rational thought. On the 
second level of the dialogue, Plato demonstrates this 
internalization. This is the dialectician par excel-
lence carrying on an inner dialogue with himself. 
On the first level of the dialogue, Plato formu-
lates the dialectical process as a five-fold scheme of 
name; description; image; knowledge or understanding of 
the object; and the true reality. While this scheme is 
not a definition of dialectic, it is the dialectician's 
attempt to give a rational account or explanation of 
knowledge by listing its components and describing 
their interaction. The order of the scheme itself 
marks the ascent to full knowledge, the experience of 
the eide themselves, through logos. First, words are 
questioned in order to better understand their meanings 
or definitions. Second, the description itself is 
worked out by turning to definitions. Third, there is 
the examination of concrete instances, whether in the 
form of objects or representations of object. Fourth, 
one turns to the minds's own activity, the source of 
understanding and true opinion where the mind directs 
its inner vision to the essences, the true realities. 
Rational thought is an ongoing interplay between the 
first four components. However, logos is not capable 
of bridging the gap between the conception and the true 
reality. Plato describes the leap from rational appre-
hension to an immediate intuitive apprehension. 
Hardly after practicing detailed comparisons of 
names and definitions and visual and other sense 
perceptions, after scrutinizing them in benevo-
lent disputation by the use of question and an-
swer without jealousy, at last in a flash under-
standing of each blazes up, and the mind, as it 
exerts all its powers to the limit of human capa-
city, is flooded with light.*1 
The metaphor of light is the expression which most 
closely resembles an intuitive grasp. Logos itself is 
inadequate because it is discursive, bound to the realm 
of becoming, to the sensuous. It must by its very 
nature remain fluid, alive, inadequate, but still in-
dispensable. 
Plato emphasizes the nature of logos by contrasting 
it with its derivative image, written prose. He warns 
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his readers against encasing the living reality of 
logos in a static mode of expression. The written word 
separates the thinking process from its articulation. 
Consequently, prose must always be interpreted and is, 
therefore, vulnerable to misinterpretation. This mis-
interpretation is possible because the written word 
cannot correct the reader who posits a faulty hypothe-
sis on the meaning of the text. The written word is 
the thought process rigidified, the effete imitation of 
the true reality of the questions and answers. The 
primary reason, then, for avoiding prose is that it 
thwarts the spirit of inquiry. Plato's paramount 
concern is the continuation of the philosophical con-
versation, not what any single philosopher might con-
tribute as an answer. Finally, the aspiring philo-
sopher cannot learn dialectic from the written word 
because dialectic can only be transmitted from teacher 
to student through mutual participation in the process. 
I certainly have composed no work in regard to 
it, nor shall I ever do so in the future, for 
there is no way of putting it into words like 
other studies. Acquaintance with it must come 
after a long period of attendance on instruction 
in the subject itself and of close companionship, 
when, suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping 
spark, it is generated in the soul and at once 
becomes self-sustaining. 2 2 
This quotation from the Seventh Letter provides a 
springboard for my concluding appraisal of the meaning 
of Platonic dialectic. These concluding comments are 
from the stance of the third level, the reader's par-
ticipation and consequent reflection on the dialogues. 
What does Plato really accomplish by means of his 
dialogues? He provides dialectical instruction for the 
reader both by the subject matter discussed in the di-
alogues, the first level, and the structure of the in-
terchange between the dialogical partners, the second 
level. I, the reader, bring the dialectical training 
to the third level when I reflect on the first and 
second levels and come to a clear understanding of 
dialectic. By taking me through his dialogues, Plato, 
in effect, teaches me how to think more clearly and 
correctly, or, what is the same, to think rationally. 
Is dialectic a method of discovery or one of 
clarification? Both, though the two modes are not an 
identity. In my attempt to clarify my understanding of 
the essential character of reality, I also discover 
what the structure of that reality is. Dialectic is 
the critical link between thought and reality. 
By raising my understanding to the level of lan-
guage, rational discourse, I also find or come to know 
the abstract structure of reality, the eidos. My en-
tering into rational thought and discourse is not an 
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event but a process which draws me closer to the real. 
Dialectic, therefore, is the tool by which I maintain 
my intellectual openness, my wonder about life. It is 
the path that allows me to put a question to Being and 
await a response. 
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